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Common Intention Constructive Trust and Coffeeshop Rent

May 7, 2026
  • Edited for Our People page
BY Dominic Chan
What has Common Intention Constructive Trust (“CICT”) got to do with coffeeshop rent?

You might be thinking of ordering, “Uncle, 1 Kopi-O C-ICT pls!

But no, such an exotic local legal drink does not exist (yet). And it has nothing to do with CICT.

The main facts of the CICT and coffeeshop rent case have been reported in the press at least twice.

First, when the plaintiff Mr. Tia Oon Lai (“TOL”) successfully sued the estate of his late mother (“Mother”) and obtained a 37.65% share of 10 years of rent (previously paid by Koufu) for a Yishun coffeeshop from October 1998 to June 2018 (“Previous Rental”). The Mother and TOL were tenants in common in equal shares of the coffeeshop (under a 30-year lease from HDB).

See:

Second, when the High Court Judgment was reversed on appeal to the Appellate Division of the High Court.See:


Here are 5 key takeaways from this case.

  1. Who Beneficially Owned the Coffeeshop – the Law on CICT

There is no easy answer to the question: who beneficially owned the coffeeshop?On record, the Mother and TOL were tenants in common in equal share (i.e. 50:50 owners) of the coffeeshop.

However, they each contributed unequal amounts towards the purchase price and did not execute a declaration of trust.

This is where CICT comes in.

Regardless of the parties’ financial contributions to the purchase price of the property, if there is sufficient evidence of an express or an inferred common intention that the parties should hold the beneficial interest in the property in a particular proportion, the parties will hold the beneficial interest in accordance with that common intention (see AD Judgment at [36]).

On appeal, contrary to the High Court decision that TOL was entitled to a 37.65% share, the Appellate Division found that there was a common intention between the Mother and TOL, at the time the lease was acquired, that the Mother would hold the full beneficial interest in the lease, and that the Mother had relied on the common intention to her detriment.

As such, the Mother also held the full beneficial interest in the Previous Rental, and TOL was not entitled to any part of it.

See AD Judgment at [40].

  1. Direct Financial Contributions, Bank Loan, Repayment from Rental

For the purposes of CICT, although direct financial contributions to the purchase price of the property are an important consideration, they are not the only basis upon which the court may infer a common intention.

In exceptional situations, the conduct of the parties may give rise to an inferred common intention.

An example of such an exceptional situation is when neither party can be said to have made any direct financial contributions towards the purchase price of the property in the typical manner because the property was financed by a mortgage for which repayments were made using rental proceeds from the property.

In this case, apart from a cash payment of S$354,154.80 made by the Mother (using her own funds), neither the Mother nor TOL made any direct financial contribution towards the purchase price as the remainder of the purchase price was financed by a 1998 bank loan which was repaid using the coffeeshop rental.

That is why the Appellate Division had to look closely at the parties’ conduct over the years, to see whether a common intention may be inferred.

  1. Exceptional Situation: Inferred Common Intention – from Conduct

The common intention was inferred from the conduct of the parties, and include the following:

  • That the Mother worked at the coffeeshop and was regarded by others as the “lady boss” who assisted the father in running the coffeeshop, whereas TOL was not involved in the coffeeshop operations since its relocation in 1984.
  • That it was the Mother who was actively arranging for the financing of the purchase of the lease and the repayment of the 1998 bank loan.
  • That the Mother had made the cash payment of S$354,154.80 using her own funds, and had organised and marshalled the funds to make the lump sum mortgage payments. In this regard, the rental derived from the coffeeshop was used by the Mother to make both the monthly and lump sum mortgage payments.
  • Having regard to the license / tenancy agreements over the years, while TOL could possibly have had some involvement in the renting out of the coffeeshop in the early years, by around 2008, it was primarily the Mother who was involved in these matters.
See AD Judgment at [48]-[54].

Significant weight was placed on a letter which Mother wrote in 2015 where, amongst other things, she said that “All the rental income from the shophouse belong to me…”, and in this letter, she was seeking to explain why the coffeeshop rental was being transferred and deposited into a tripartite account with her two daughters, Sally and Poh Kim. See AD Judgment at [65]-[72].

Much weight was also placed on TOL’s omission in 2018 to stake his claim (see point 4 below).

  1. Contemporaneous Objections are Crucial

TOL did not raise objections at two crucial junctures.

First, when Mother wrote the 2015 letter where, amongst other things, she said that “All the rental income from the shophouse belong to me…”. TOL was physically present when this letter was read out and signed by the Mother. However, TOL did not raise any query as to the contents of this letter at that material time.

Second, when Mother, TOL and Koufu entered into a “Rental Splitting Agreement” in August 2018 (whereby the rent moving forward from August 2018 onwards would be split equally between the Mother and TOL). However, TOL did not take this opportunity to pursue a share of the Previous Rental prior to July 2018.

In fact, TOL’s omission to make any claim for the Previous Rental both before and after the Rental Splitting Agreement was signed, until after the Mother passed away, strongly suggests that he believed that he was not entitled to a share of the Previous Rental.

See AD Judgment at [15]-[17], [68]-[72], [80]-[88].

  1. Observations

In summary, when family members deal with each other with respect to property and money of a substantial amount, it would be prudent to put things down clearly in writing – especially when it comes to determining the beneficial owners of shared property (and in what proportion), and where the direct financial contributions are insufficient to shed light on the common intention of the parties.

Conduct of the parties at the start and throughout the years then become critical to infer any common intention.

In any event, the failure to raise objections at crucial junctures could be held against the person who ought to have raised them – and even swing the balance against them in the final analysis.

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